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 There has recently been an increase in the
interest in self-employment. This is true for
academic economic research as well as for
society in general. Interestingly, in a growing
body on the determinants of self-employ-
ment, some studies, (see Blau, 1987, and
Parker 1996 for time-series evidence, and
Bruce 2000, and Schuetze 2000, for micro-
econometric evidence), argue that individuals
enter self-employment to avoid tax. In this
context it is therefore natural to think about
the magnitude of income underreporting by
the self-employed. If it is possible to underre-
port self-employment income by a large
extent, then we should be more concerned
about the results obtained in the above men-
tioned studies. 
It is also the case that in some countries,
including Finland, the share of self-employed
of the labour force has increased (see
Blanchflower 2004, for an overview of recent
trends of self-employment in an internation-
al perspective). In Finland, the share of the
total non-agricultural employment that is
self-employed has risen from under 7% in the
mid 1980s to over 9% in the early years of
the 21st century. This fact makes it more
interesting to study income underreporting
by the self-employed.
However, measuring income underreport-
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behind underreporting of income is to avoid
the true income to be registered in data avail-
able to others. In Pissarides & Weber (1989),
(henceforth P & W), however, new approach
based on food expenditure is used. P&W,
using UK data estimate that self-employment
income is underreported by some 55%. In
short, this method assumes that income
underreporting occurs among the self-
employed but not the employees in employ-
ment. Food expenditure, on the other hand,
is assumed to be correctly reported both by
employees in employment and the self-
employed. The “marginal propensity to con-
sume food” is assumed to be the same both
for the self-employed and the employees. It is
then possible to calculate how much income
was needed for the self-employed to consume
the amount of food actually consumed.
In this paper, we estimate underreporting
of self-employment income in Finland using
the P&W method. The data we use is data
from a survey of household expenditures
compiled by Statistics Finland during the
years 1994 to 1996. The result of the estima-
tion is that depending on which households
are defined to be self-employed, self-employ-
ment income on average is underreported by
some 16-40%. Since the share of total
income in Finland that comes from self-
employment is about 8% of GDP1, this
methods yield the result that the “black”
economy has a size that is about 1.3 – 3.2%
of GDP.
Previous research
Apart from the original P & W study which
used UK data from the 1982 Family
Expenditure Survey, there have been a limit-
ed number of studies applying the same
methodology. Baker (1993), and Cullinan
(1997) also have investigated income under-
reporting by the self-employed for the UK.
Baker (1993) also used data from the Family
Expenditure Survey, but for all the years from
1978 to 1991. The result in this study was
that actual self-employment income was
about 1.3 to 1.5 time larger than reported
income. Cullinan (1997) again used the UK
Family Expenditure Survey, but this time for
the years 1987 and 1992. The result was that
self-employment income is underreported by
some 19-37%. Outside the UK, the issue has
been investigated for Sweden by Apel (1994),
and for Canada by Mirus and Smith (1996),
and Schuetze (2002). Apel (1994) used data
from the 1988 “Hushållens utgifter” data set,
the Swedish equivalent to the UK Family
Expenditure Survey, and found that reported
self-employment income should be multi-
plied by a factor of 1.35 in order to arrive at
the true income. Mirus and Smith (1996)
used data from the 1990 Canadian Survey of
Family Expenditures. Their result was that
self-employment income was underreported
by some 12.5%. Schuetze (2002) used the
same data as Mirus and Smith (1996) but
used six years of data instead of only one in
an attempt to disaggregate underreporting by
year and occupation. In summary, this study
found that the self-employed have underre-
ported earnings by some 11-23%.
This method is obviously not the only
way to calculate the size of the black econo-
my, and this paper should be seen as part of a
much larger literature on the measurement of
the “shadow” or “underground” economy.
Indeed, Schneider and Enste (2000) divide
the ways to calculate the size of the black
economy into three broad categories, “direct”
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1.  Source: The Income Distribution Statistics of Statistics Finland, various issues, and author’s own calculations.approaches, “indirect” approaches, and
“model-based” approaches. The “direct”
approach makes use of direct evidence in the
form of surveys or tax auditing evidence in
order to estimate the size of the underground
economy. The general idea of the “indirect”
methods is that the researcher uses various
economic or other indicators that indirectly
may be used to extract information of the size
of the underground economy. “Model-based”
methods explicitly consider the multiple
causes and consequences of the black econo-
my by using dynamic multiple-indicators
multiple causes (MIMIC) models (Scheider
and Enste 2000:97-98). 
Earlier research has produced some results
regarding the size of the black economy for
the Nordic countries using other methods
than the one applied in this paper. Regarding
“direct” approaches representative studies for
Norway and Denmark are Goldstein et al.
(2002) for Norway, and Mogensen et al.
(1995) for Denmark. These studies, which
are based on survey responses, indicate that
the size of the black economy is some 2-5%
for in Denmark, and 1-2% in Norway. 
Schneider and Enste (2000) summarise
most of the international research done using
“indirect” methods. Lackó (1996, 1997,
1998, 1999) calculate the size of the black
economy for the Nordic countries for the
year 1990. In these studies, Finland’s black
economy is estimated at being 13.3% of
GDP, Denmark’s 16.9%, Sweden’s 11.0%,
and Norway’s 9.3%. Schneider and Enste
(2000, p. 104) also provide averages for
1994-1995 and 1996-1997 for the
Scandinavian countries for the underground
economy. Interestingly, they report that the
size of the underground economy has
increased in all three Scandinavian countries.
In Denmark from 17.8% to 18.2%, in
Norway from 18.2% to 19.4%, and in
Sweden from 18.6% to 19.5%. 
In summary, it is fair to say that the fre-
quently used, more macroeconomically ori-
ented indirect ways to measure the size of the
underground economy has yielded estimates
of the size of the underground economy that
is far larger that the ones obtained by the
method used in this paper. The most obvious
explanation for this is that the present
method assumes that underreporting of
income takes place in the self-employed sec-
tor of the economy only. This assumption
will bias the estimates of the underground
economy down, if underreporting of income
also to some extent occurs among employees.
And as Goldstein et al. (2002) shows for
Norway, this is probably occurring at least to
some extent. 
A review of the P&W (1989) model
The expenditure-based estimation approach,
originally developed by P & W, relies on
three major assumptions. 1) the reporting of
expenditure by all groups of the population is
accurate. 2) the reporting of income by some
groups in the population is accurate. 3) the
expenditure function on some items are the
same for all groups in the population. 
Income underreporting is then modelled
in the following way:  Ci is the food con-
sumption of household i on after tax income
Yi 
′. Zi is a vector of household characteris-
tics. It is assumed that Ci  is correctly report-
ed by all households, Yi 
′ is correctly reported
by employees in employment and Zi  is cor-
rectly recorded for all households. Let then Yi
′  be the “true” income for household i. Then
Yi =Yi 
′  for employees in employment but for
the self-employed we have the following: 
(1) Yi =ki 
′Yi 
′, ki  ≥ 1.
where ki  is a random variable that shows the
extent of under-reporting of income by self-
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more underreporting by household i. 
For food expenditure there is an expenditure
function, 
(2)     1nCi = Zi α + β 1nYi
p+ εi
where α is a parameter, β is a scalar, the “mar-
ginal propensity to consume” food and εi is
white noise, and Zi is a set of household char-
acteristics. Yi
p is the measure of income that
influences consumption decisions. This
measure of income is likely to be less volatile
than observed income Yi
′. P & W refer to this
measure of income as permanent income,
without necessarily requiring that that the
expenditure function conforms exactly to the
permanent income hypothesis. 
The distinction between permanent
income and measured income is needed in
this context because for a given level of per-
manent income, the measured income of the
self-employed may be more variable than the
measured income of employees in employ-
ment. If this is true, then the consequence is
that the measure of the income underreport-
ing by the self-employed will have to be
adjusted accordingly. In general it is assumed
that permanent and measured income are
related by
(3) Yi = piYi
p
where pi is a random variable. The expected
value of pi depends on random events. In a
“good” year, pi will have a mean that is bigger
than 1. It is assumed that the mean of pi is
the same both for employees and the self-
employed. However, the variance of pi is
expected to be bigger for the self-employed
than for the employees. 
(1) and (3) will then imply that the log of
permanent income is 
(4) 1nYi
p = 1nYi
′ – 1npi + 1nki
Substituting this into 2 yields the following
equation:
(5) 1nCi = Zi α + β 1nYi
′ – β1np
+ β1nki + εi
It is now possible to run the regression: 
(6) 1nCi = Zi α + β 1nYi
′ + γSEi + ηi
where SEi is a dummy taking the value 1 if
the household is self-employed and 0 if not.
Remembering the above mentioned assump-
tions about p and k, i.e. that 1n p is the same
for both groups, k =1 for the employed
whereas  k ≥1for the self-employed, we can
see that a rough estimate of income underre-
porting may be obtained by
(7) 1nk= γ /β
However, when treating pi and ki as random
variables, things become more complicated,
and to make estimation possible P & W
assume that they are log normal and write
them as deviations from their means, 1npi=
µp+ ui , and 1nki= µk+ vi , where ui and vi have
zero means and constant variances σu
2 and
σv
2 within each occupational group. Taking
this into account, and substituting into (2)
from (4) we get the following expression:
(8) 1nCi = Zi α + β 1nYi
′ – β(µp– µk) 
– β (ui– vi) + εi
Compared to equation (5) it is clear that not
only the intercept, but also the variance of
the errors will differ between the self-
employed and the employees, with the self-
employed generally having bigger variance. 
102 Edvard JohanssonWhat one would like to estimate is average
the average of income underreporting
(denoted by k
_
). Assuming log-normality, it
can be shown that k
_




= µk+ – σ2
vSE 2
where σ2
vSE denotes the variance of ki, and the
subscript  SE denotes the group of self-
employed. Further, given that pi and  ki are
treated as random, it can the be shown that in
(6) γ = β⎦ µk+1/2 (σ2
vSE – σ2
uEE )-, where σ2
u is
the variance of pi and the subscripts SE and
EE refer to the self-employed and employed
respectively. However, from this estimate it is
not possible to isolate µk, because log pi will
differ between the self-employed and the
employees. Then, if γ from equation is substi-











β    2
However, no data on pi and ki of course exist,
so underreporting cannot directly be estimat-
ed using (9). Instead, following P & W, an
income equation is estimated in order to
obtain estimates for the income variance 
of errors for the self-employed  (σ2
ζSE ) and
(σ2
ζEE)for the employees  separately. Under a
set of assumptions (see the appendix for fur-
ther explanations) it is then possible to calcu-
late an lower bound of underreporting by the
self-employed as 
γ    1
(11) 1n k
_
l= – – – (σ2
ζSE – σ2
ζEE)
β    2
and an upper bound as 
γ    1
(12) 1n k
_






The data set used in this study is called
Kulutustutkimus and is a household expendi-
ture survey compiled by Statistics Finland.
This survey gives information on expendi-
tures for different groups of goods and servic-
es for different types of households. Data are
collected by a combination of personal inter-
views, diaries, and register information, the
income data being taken from register infor-
mation. The data in this study are from the
years 1994-1996.
In this study households with two adults
are studied. Following earlier research, I
exclude households where the head of the
household is older than 64 years old and
household whose main occupation is farm-
ing. The reason why I do not include farmers
in the study is that they are likely to have an
expenditure function for food that is not the
same as the one for other households, since
they can be expected to produce large parts of
their food themselves. Finally, I also exclude
households where the head is not working all
of the 12 months of the year. This because it
is necessary to reduce the effect of hours
worked on the results. 
To start with, we consider a household to
be self-employed if the socio-economic status
of the head of the household is self-employ-
ment, which means that the head of the
household has been self-employed for more
than 6 months during the year. This is simi-
lar to other research. However, the definition
of which household is to be considered self-
employed is not entirely straightforward, and
it is not unlikely that the way a self-employed
household is defined also may affect the esti-
mates of underreporting. For example, it may
be the case that a household with both spous-
es self-employed have greater opportunities
to underreport income than a household
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self-employed and the other spouse doing
something else. Because of this, we also con-
sider an alternative definition, in which we
only consider household where both spouses
have worked at least 6 months each as self-
employed during the year as a self-employed
household.  
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics
for the sample considered in this study. There
seems to be some interesting differences
between the self-employed households and
employee households, for both definitions of
a self-employed household. Firstly, it looks
like the (reported) disposable income is
slightly higher for the employees, but the
number for the log of the food expenditure
looks higher for the self-employed. Secondly,
the variance of the income of the self-
employed is much higher than for the
employees2. Thirdly, although not a particu-
lar topic for this paper, it is interesting to
notice that the self-employed seem to live in
owner-occupied housing to a greater extent
than do the employees. 
Then for the actual results. Before going to
any regression results, a first crude approxima-
tion of the magnitude of underreporting by
the self-employed can be obtained by consid-
ering the differences between the means of
income and consumption for the employees
and the self-employed, and assuming that the
proportion of income that is spent on food is
the same for both groups. From table 1 we
find that this difference is 0.10 log points, i.e.
about 10.5%, for households headed by a self-
employed, and for the definition where both
spouses are self-employed, the difference is
some 0.17 log points, or around 18.5%.
Thus, this crude measure indicates that if
both spouses are self-employed, more under-
reporting occurs. The straightforward expla-
nation for this is that households where both
spouses are self-employed have better oppor-
tunities to underreport income as a larger part
of the income comes from self-employment. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Head of household self-employed   Both spouses self-employed
self-employed employees self-employed employees
Log (food expenditure) 10.07 10.00 10.14 10.00
(0.48) (0.45) (0.38) (0.46)
Log (disposable income) 12.03 12.06 12.03 12.06
(0.48) (0.30) (0.41) (0.32)
Own house 0.89 0.77 0.89 0.78
(0.32) (0.42) (0.32) (0.41)
Number of children 1.22 1.16 1.21 1.16
(1.24) (1.17) (1.10) (1.19)
Age 42.82 40.79 43.11 40.91
(9.37) (9.33) (7.94) (9.44)
N 285 1769 148 1906
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses 
2.  This feature of the administratively collected self-employment income has earlier been documented in Johans-
son (2000). Then for regression-based results. In a
first step, it is useful to examine the degree of
underreporting by the self-employed treating
pi and  ki (see equation 4) as constants. This
implies a straightforward estimation of (6),
which we perform for both definitions of a
self-employed household (see columns 1 and
3 of table 2)3. Indeed, the coefficient for self-
employment is positive, as expected. In terms
of magnitudes (i.e. the antilog of γ /β), the
results imply a degree of underreporting of
24% for the regression where the head of the
household is self-employed, and some 41%
for the regression where both spouses are self-
employed. The difference between these esti-
mates and the rough estimates of about
10.5% and 18.5% from above can be inter-
preted as the effect of controlling for other
exogenous factors affecting household food
consumption, such as household size, num-
ber of children etc. 
In this household food consumption
equation, it is not unlikely that income is
endogenous. This may be due to the fact that
food consumption affects labour supply, and
thereby household income. Consequently, we
tested whether the log of household income
was endogenous, given our chosen instru-
ments, for both definitions of a self-
employed household. According to a
Hausman-type test, the hypothesis that the
log of income was exogenous in the house-
hold food consumption function was reject-
ed. As instruments we utilised information
on spouse’s labour supply, which affects
household income, but not necessarily house-
hold food consumption (see table 2 for fur-
ther details). 
As we rejected the hypothesis that income
is exogenous in the household food con-
sumption function, we went on and re-esti-
mated (6) using two-stages least squares esti-
mation. The results of those estimations are
shown in columns 2 and 4 of table 2, for the
two definitions of a self-employed household.
Although the parameter estimates have
changed somewhat, they do not qualitatively
alter the results. In terms of magnitudes of
underreporting of self-employment income,
the 2SLS results imply a degree of underre-
porting of 16.5% and 42.0% for the two def-
initions of a self-employed household. The
difference between these estimates the esti-
mates from the OLS estimations can be inter-
preted as simultaneity bias. It should also be
emphasized, that the regression-based results
do not alter the notion that if both spouses
are self-employed, more underreporting
occurs.
As discussed in the theoretical section, it
is perhaps more appropriate to treat pi and ki
as random variables. It is then not possible to
estimate an average for income underreport-
ing, but it is possible to compute upper and
lower bounds for underreporting. In order to
do that, we need the marginal propensity to
consume,  β, the coefficient of the self-
employment dummy, γ, the residual variance
of reported income for the self-employed and
the employees, σ2
ζSE and σ2
ζEE, and the vari-
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3.  The working assumption in this paper is that the expenditure function for food for the self-employed and the
employees are the same. We tested for differences in the coefficients of the self-employed and the employees by
introducing an interactive term where the self-employment dummy was multiplied with income. The t-value
obtained was –0.136 and the null hypothesis was thereby not rejected. Similarly, we tested for non-linearity in
the effect of income on expenditure by introducing the square of the log of income in the expenditure function.
The t-value of that coefficient was -0.432, and therefore we reject the hypothesis of non-linearity in the effect
of income on food expenditure. 106 Edvard Johansson
Table 2: Regression results for household food expenditure
Head of household self-employed   Both spouses self-employed
(OLS) (2SLS) (OLS) (2SLS)
Self-employed 0.041 0.047 0.105 0.114
(1.71) (1.93) (3.26)** (3.52)**
Log of household income 0.191 0.307 0.194 0.325
(6.98)** (5.57)** (7.08)** (5.69)**
Age -0.001 -0.008 -0.003 -0.011
(0.12) (0.91) (0.35) (1.24)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.02) (1.69) (1.25) (2.01)*
Number of children 0.258 0.251 0.258 0.249
(17.00)** (16.11)** (17.01)** (16.00)**
Children squared -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011
(4.10)** (4.01)** (4.05)** (3.94)**
Children younger than 7 -0.067 -0.069 -0.066 -0.067
(4.47)** (4.58)** (4.40)** (4.51)**
Constant 7.345 6.115 7.354 5.965
(21.85)** (10.03)** (21.95)** (9.50)**
Observations 2053 2053 2053 2053
R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
F-test for excluded 
instruments, p-value  0.000 0.000
Wu-Hausman-test for 
exogeneity of log of 
household income, p-value 0.016 0.009
Sargan-test for over-
identification, p-value  0.265 0.806
T-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Regressions also include a constant, and 5 controls for regions, and 13 controls
for time of data collection. Additional instruments in the first stage of the 2SLS regressions: House ownership, number of rooms in dwelling, Spouse’s
months of work, Spouse’s months of self-employment, Spouse’s months of unemployment, Spouse’s months of part-time work, and the product of
the self-employment dummies with Age, Age squared, Children, Children squared, Children younger than 7, Spouse’s months of work Own house,
and the regional dummies.
Table 3: 
Estimates needed for calculation of upper and lower bounds of income under-reporting





Head of household  0.307 0.047 0.158 0.139 0.170 0.053
self-employed (5.57) (1.93)
Both spouses 
self-employed 0.325 0.114 0.143 0.116 0.131 0.064
(5.69) (3.52)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-valuesare given in table 3. Using (11) and (12) we
can then estimate the lower  k
_
l and upper  k
_
u
bounds of income underreporting. For
households where the head is self-employed,
the upper and lower bounds can then be cal-
culated to be 23.5% and 10.0%. For house-
holds where both spouses are self-employed,
the upper and lower bounds can be calculat-
ed to be 46.9% and 37.3%.  
Concluding remarks
In this paper the extent of income underre-
porting by self-employed households was
estimated by the expenditure based approach
developed by P & W (1989). Two different
definitions of a self-employed household
were used, one where only the head of the
household was required to be self-employed,
and another where both spouses were
required to be self-employed. For the first
definition we found self-employment income
to be underreported by some 16.5% on aver-
age, and for the second definition by some
42% on average. This supports the hypothe-
sis that the larger a household’s share of
income that comes from self-employment,
the larger is the share of income that is con-
cealed. Using these estimates, and assuming
that underreporting of income occurs in the
self-employment sector of the economy only,
it is possible to gauge overall underreporting
of income in the Finnish economy. Since
income from self-employment is about 8% of
all income in Finland, the estimate of the
black economy in Finland is about 1.3% of
GDP, using the first definition of a self-
employed household, and about 3.2% using
the second.
It is likely that both estimates are underes-
timates of total tax-evasion in the economy.
This because it is relatively unlikely that tax
evasion is occurring in the self-employed sec-
tors of the economy only. One can easily
think that farmers, students, and retired indi-
viduals receive income from work that do not
show up in any official records. However,
since the purpose of tax evasion is to conceal
income from the authorities, it is of course
very difficult to make reliable estimates
because of the lack of data. This expenditure-
based approach can, therefore, be seen as an
interesting attempt to measure something
that otherwise would be very hard to get an
estimate of. 
There is clearly room for more research in
this area. One aim for the future would be to
disaggregate underreporting according to
industries or time periods and relate these
disaggregated measures to the opportunity to
and incentive for tax evasion. Thus, do we see
more tax evasion in a years with higher taxa-
tion, and do we see more tax evasion in
industries or sectors where the opportunity to
cheat is greater? Schuetze (2002) provides
some evidence on these matters, but the liter-
ature is still very much in its infancy. 
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108 Edvard JohanssonAppendix: Derivation of upper and
lower bounds of income under-
reporting
The income equation needed to calculate
income variance of errors for the self-
employed (σ2
ζSE ) and for the employees
(σ2
ζEE )can be written as follows: 
(A1) 1nYi
′ = Ziδ1 + Xiδ2 + ζi
where  is a set of identifying instruments.
Suppose then that the unexplained variations
in permanent income in (A1) have the same
variance for both the employees and the self-
employed. This should not be a too unrealis-
tic assumption, given that these variations are
due to omitted variables and that the self-
employment dummy is one of the regressors
in (A1). Remembering that  σ2
vEE = 0 we have
that: 
(A2) varζSE – varζEE  = var(u–v) SE – varuEE












where ρ is the partial correlation coefficient
between uSE and vSE . If ρ=0 then σ2
vSE and
σ2
uSE are negatively related, so (A3) gives a
lower bound when σ2
uSE takes its lowest value.
The lowest value σ2
vSE can take is 0 which
implies, using (A3) and (9), that the lower
bound is: 
1         γ   1 (11) 1n k
_
l= µk  + – σ2
vSE = – – – (σ2
ζSE – σ2
ζEE)
2        β   2
Since the income of the self-employment
have at least as much variance as the income
from the employees the lowest values that
σ2
uSE can take is σ2
uEE. The upper bound of
underreporting is therefore: 
1         γ   1 (12) 1n k
_
l= µk  + – σ2
vSE = – + – (σ2
ζSE – σ2
ζEE)
2        β    2
If ρ≠ 0, i.e., if the covariance between uSE
and vSE is not zero it is not possible to calcu-
late a range of underreporting without fur-
ther information on u and v. A zero covari-
ance would imply that whatever the income
of the self-employed household turned out to
be in a particular year, the household would
tend to report the same percentage of it to the
tax authorities. P & W however argue that a
self-employed household would like to keep
his or her income approximately constant
over years as to not raise the suspicions of the
tax authorities. Thus, if a self-employed per-
son has had a particularly high income in one
year he or she might be less inclined to
declare all of it than if the income was more
“normal” Similarly, if the income is particu-
larly low he or she might be more inclined to
declare it. 
Such a behaviour gives implies a positive
covariance between uSE and vSE. If so, P & W
argue that that the upper bound of the mean
of under-reporting, k
_
u, needs to be adjusted
upwards. However, as P&W show by exam-
ple, even relatively values of , the upper
bound does not rise very much.
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